This paper explores the link between upstream input pricing and downstream strategic delegation decisions. It complements earlier contributions by studying how environmental emissions and tax payments alter the incentives business owners have to divert their managers from prot maximization in favor of sales revenue generation. Two scenarios are compared depending on whether the upstream supplier precommits to a xed input price or adopts a exible price strategy. Corresponding Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibria are characterized and elements of comparative statics analysis are presented. The analysis conrms that previous results showing that a price precommitment makes the upstream supplier better o and downstream rms worse o carry over to situations in which production generates pollution.
Introduction
This chapter bridges two elds of research in which Georges Zaccour has been active: the analysis of vertical relations and environmental and resource economics. The former studies relations between rms that intervene successively along the value chain whereas the latter deals with the relations between the economy and the environment. We can trace back his interest for vertical relations to his early contributions on the analysis of energy markets (Zaccour, 1983 (Zaccour, , 1987 Breton et al., 1990) . Today this interest is mainly manifested in his work on marketing channels. But, it also comes up tangentially in a variety of contributions ranging from environmental economics where sustainable tourism development may require tourism destinations to delegate expenditures in environmental remediation to a regional authority (Claude & Zaccour, 2009) to institutional economics where good institutions are produced by the strategic precommitment of civil society to ght corruption (Ngendakuriyo & Zaccour, 2013) .
Strategies of delegation and precommitment are at the heart of the literature on strategic delegation to which this chapter contributes. Starting with Vickers (1985) , Fershtman & Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) , this literature has examined the incentives owners have to delegate production decisions. By hiring a manager, the owner of a rm can credibly commit to pursue a goal that diers from maximizing prot. The managerial compensation contract will then be designed to convey the appropriate managerial incentives to guide the manager in his day-to-day decisions. Its terms will provide for a variable target-based bonus that rewards the manager's performance in achieving some alternative goal to (pure) prot maximization. This variable part may be based on any one or a combination of the following criteria : prot, sales volume or revenue, market share, and corporate social responsibilityor environmental objectives. Since rational managers respond to nancial incentives conveyed by the variable part of their remuneration, they will be encouraged to deviate from prot maximization.
As is well known, by choosing to reward sales revenue rather than prot, the owner encourages the manager to adopt a more aggressive market behavior. Namely, the managerial rm will produce more (for any level of production of its competitors) than a prot-maximizing owner-managed rm. Financial disclosure rules usually ensure that the incentives embedded in managerial compensation contracts are common knowledge. ! Any change in the performance criteria presiding over managerial compensation will then affect the expectations of competing rms. This opens the door to a strategic manipulation of compensation contracts: each owner attempting to alter the expectations of rival rms to its own advantage.
But deviating from prot maximization is only protable when the deviation is unilateral.
And, since all owners face similar incentives to deviate, widespread deviations are to be expected and excessive output supply will result into lower prots for all. Hence, the opportunity to strategically delegate day-to-day production decisions to a manager closes as a trap on rm owners who actually nd themselves confronted with a Prisoner's Dilemma.
Strategic delegation provides a much needed rationale for observed deviations from prot maximization. This rationale, however, assumes that rms are vertically integrated and produce their own inputs. When this assumption is relaxed, the vertical externality linked to input pricing appears to have a disciplining role on downstream rms' behavior.
If duopolists buy in inputs from a common monopolist supplier, Park (2002) shows that strategic delegation becomes unprotable for business owners. Wang & Wang (2010) reach the same conclusion by assuming that managerial incentive contract rewards a combination of prot and market share (rather than prot and sale revenues). On the contrary, Liao (2008; 2010) shows that strategic delegation retains its strategic value if the input supplier precommits to a xed input price. This conclusion is backed by Wang (2015) , who proves it true when compensation contracts reward the manager's performance relative to peers. " Finally, Claude (2018) shows that Park (2002) 's main results no longer holds if we consider a downstream market consisting of more than two but a nite number of rms.
This paper re-examines the link between vertical externalities and strategic delegation decisions. We consider an extended version of Park (2002) 's model in which downstream rms generate pollution emissions when they process the intermediate product into a nal good. Specically, we assume that the emission of a rm, per unit of output produced, is inversely related to that rm's productivity in processing inputs. Since pollution emissions are assumed to be taxed, downstream rms have an incentive to internalize them, at least in part.
Two papers have investigated the consequences of strategic delegation for environmental policy-making. In a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods and pollution emissions, ! See, Vural (2018) for the example of the ball bearing compagny SKF " This form of strategic delegation was rst studied by Fumas (1992) and Miller & Pazgal (2002) Barcena-Ruiz & Garzon (2002) nd that strategic delegation is protable. At the equilibrium, managerial rms produce and emit more than prot-maximizing owner-managed rms. Consequently, the optimal environmental tax is higher than that required to regulate a standard Cournot market. Pal (2012) generalizes this result to dierentiated industries. However, none of these papers has investigated how factor market imperfections alter managerial incentives in downstream markets, which is the main purpose of our paper. Since our model encompasses those of Park (2002) and Claude (2018) , we check the robustness of their results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 solves the managerial sub-game. Sections 4 and 5 characterize the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) depending on whether the upstream monopolist precommits to a price. SPNE outcomes are compared in Section 6. The last section concludes.
The Model
We extend the model of Park (2002) to account for the existence of pollution (or waste).
Consider a vertical market structure with upstream monopoly and downstream quantity competition. The single upstream monopolist (indexed by up) produces at no cost a homogeneous input x that it sells at a non-discriminatory price k>0. Let x i denote the input consumption of rm i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and X = ∑ n i=1 x i the aggregate input demand. The upstream supplier's prot function is simply π up = k X. Downstream rms rely on the same technology to turn the intermediate product x into a nal good y. Let y i denote the output of Firm i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and Y = ∑ n i=1 y i the aggregate downstream output. Firm i's production function is y i = ε x i , where ε ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter measuring Firm i's productivity.
Pollution emissions come as a by-product of production. More precisely, they are inversely related to Firm i's productivity and given by e i = (1 − ε) x i . # We assume that the government levies a tax on pollution emissions at a rate τ ≥ 0. Obviously, the more inecient the rm is (the lower the value of ε), the higher is the quantity of pollution emitted for each unit of the nal good y produced and the higher is the rm's tax bill for a given level of output. Conversely, if ε is assumed equal to 1 then the rm no longer emits pollution and its environmental tax bill is zero. Without loss of generality, we assume that downstream rms face no other production cost than that associated with input purchase.
Demand for the nal good y is represented by the inverse demand function P (Y ) = a−bY with a, b > 0. Under the above assumptions, Firm i's prot function is given by
Using the production function, the above can be expressed in terms of y only:
denotes rm i's eective marginal cost of production; namely, the sum of the rm's input expenditure (k/ε) and environmental tax bill (τ (1 − ε) /ε). Observe that ∂A/∂ε < 0, # We assume that the more ecient the rm is, the less input is used per unit of output and thus the lower the level of waste or emission generated. This assumption conforms to empirical ndings by Shadbegian & Gray (2003) . Examining the determinants of environmental performance at paper mills, they found that high productivity plants pollute less. More precisely, a 10% higher productivity level is associated with a 2.5% lower emission per unit of output. Furthermore, they found that unexpectedly high productivity levels are associated with unexpectedly low levels of emissions per unit of output. Shadbegian & Gray (2003) advance two main explanations for their results. On the one hand, newer production plants may be more ecient in production but also designed so as to reduce pollution emissions or waste. On the other hand, older, more inecient, rms may face less regulatory pressure and retrotting their facilities may be extremely dicult so that abatement possibilities are reduced.
∂A/∂τ > 0 and ∂A/∂k > 0, which is in accordance with intuition. Indeed, an increase in the price of factors (τ for emissions, and k for the intermediate product) leads to a corresponding increase in marginal cost, whereas an increase in the productivity parameter ε translates into a reduced (eective) marginal cost.
The owners of downstream rms may hire managers to run their rms on their behalf. The decision to hire a manager leads to the so-called divorce between ownership and control.
Indeed, when management and control functions are divorced, agency problems arise if the manager's interests diverge from those of the owner (Sengul et al., 2012) . In the remainder of this paper, we assume that all agency problems have been resolved $ to focus our attention on the strategic value of delegation decisions. Following Vickers (1985) , Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman & Judd (1987) , we assume that owners hire managers in order to credibly commit their businesses to objectives that dier from prot maximization. Here, we assume that this objective is the maximization of a weighted sum of prots and sales revenue; i.e.,
The prot weight α i is chosen strategically by the owner of rm i in order to manipulate the anticipations of rival rms to its own advantage (i.e., in a protable way).
The corresponding departure from prot maximization is credible since the inclusion of a target-based bonus in managerial compensation contracts ensures that appropriate incentives are conveyed to managers. % Depending on the value selected for α i , owners can encourage a wide range of behaviors. To see this, let us rewrite Equation (3) as:
Then the performance measure has straightforward interpretation. By choosing α i = 1, rm owners encourage pure prot maximization. However, if α i is set lower than one, they direct their managers to pursue revenue generation at the expense of prots and if α i is set greater than one they direct their managers to pursue cost minimization at the expense of prot generation. We let ⃗ α = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ) denote the prole of prot weights chosen by downstream owners.
We consider two scenarios depending on whether the upstream monopolist is able to precommit to a xed input price. In the rst scenario, we assume that price is dicult to change and communicate to customers. In this case, price commitments are credible.
The order of moves is then as follows. The upstream monopolist moves rst and sets the input price. After observing this price, downstream owners design their managerial compensation contracts simultaneously and independently. Obviously, the latter simply means setting the value of the prot weight α i . At the last stage of the game, managers compete in quantities so as to maximize their compensation, taking into account their target-based bonus and the input price. $ After delegation, the manager may not act in the owner's interest and engage in opportunistic practices and other self-serving behaviors. Managerial opportunism arises from two main sources (Eisenhardt, 1989) : (a) the objectives of the owner and the manager may conict and (b) the owner may not be able to observe the behavior of the manager. The rst is of little relevance in our context. Indeed, we assume that the manager is oered a performance-based bonus which reduces conicts of interests and ensures that the manager will adhere to the owner's supply strategy. However, appropriate monitoring and governance mechanisms should be put in place in order to treat the second source of managerial opportunism. Indeed, unobservable behaviors may result in expropriation of the company funds (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) . Common examples include the excessive consumption of perquisites such as luxurious oces and company jets. More broadly, managerial discretion may result in the allocation of company funds to the pursuit of pet projects or that of an irrational expansion of the rm. % Consider a two-parts compensation contract
denotes the base salary and w V i > 0 denotes the bonus rate that rewards performance as measured by F i . Given this compensation contract, it is equivalent for manager i to maximize the compensation w i or the target F i . For more on this point see Kopel & Pezzino (2018) . In the second scenario, we assume that prices are easy to change and communicate and the upstream monopolist is unable (or unwilling) to make a price precommitment. Without price commitment the upstream monopolist retains the opportunity to adjust the input price to changes in the behavior of downstream rms. The order of moves is then as follows. In the rst stage of the game, Firm owners simultaneously and independently choose the compensation contracts that will be oered to hired managers (i.e., they set α i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n) . In the second stage, when the prole of managerial incentives ⃗ α is known and common knowledge, the upstream monopolist sets the input price k. Then, in the last stage, managers compete in quantities so as to maximize their compensation taking into account their target-based bonuses and the input price.
The dierence between the timing of moves in the above two scenarios is illustrated in Figure 1 . Both three stage games are solved by backward induction. Since the last stage is common to both games, it will be analyzed separately in the next section.
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption: Assumption 1. We assume that the eciency of rms is suciently high, 1 ≥ ε > τ a+τ , (or the price of energy is suciently low, aε
(1−ε) > τ > 0) to ensure that all rms are active at the equilibrium.
The managerial subgame
At stage 3, given ⃗ α and k, each manager i simultaneously and independently chooses a quantity y i so as to maximize F i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Assuming an interior solution, the resulting system of rst-order conditions is
Obviously, these conditions repeat the standard provision that marginal revenue must equal the marginal cost of production. However, when the manager strikes the balance between marginal costs and revenue, he does not consider the rm's actual marginal cost of production A (k, τ, ε), but its depreciated (or inated) value by the weight factor α i . By solving the i-th equation in (5) for y i we obtain:
If α i < 1, observe that the manager i is induced to produce more than a prot-maximizing rm owner (for each output choice of its competitors). By choosing prot weights that are lower than one, owners induce their managers to be more aggressive on the output market.
Summing Equations (6) over i results in:
or, equivalently,
This last equation implicitly denes the equilibrium industry output Y ⋆ as a function of a weighted sum of the marginal costs of production incurred by the rms making up the industry. This result repeats the observation by Bergstrom & Varian (1985a,b) that Cournot-Nash quantities depend solely on the sum of the rms' characteristics and, especially, are independent of how those characteristics are distributed. By substituting the inverse demand function P (Y ) = a − bY into the xed-point Equation (8) and solving for the equilibrium industry output level, we obtain:
Now, by plugging this quantity back into Firm i's (inclusive) reaction function (6), we obtain:
The implied equilibrium price is:
. (11) 
Price precommitment
In this rst scenario, the upstream monopolist precommits to an input price k. So, at the time when owners design their managers' compensation contracts, the pricing policy of the upstream monopolist is known and common knowledge. The timing of the game is depicted in Figure 1 . At Stage 2, each owner simultaneously and independently chooses the incentives to provide to management (i.e., the prot weight α i ). At stage 1, the upstream supplier sets the input price k. Now, we resume the backward induction procedure starting with the design of managerial incentive contracts.
Choice of managerial incentive contracts
Each owner i sets the prot weight α i so as to maximize its prot taking the input price k as given; i.e., owner i solves
Assuming an interior solution, we obtain the following system of n rst-order conditions for prot maximization:
The rst term on the left-hand side corresponds to a gain in sales revenue linked to the price increase resulting from the reduction in total industry output. The second term corresponds to a prot loss linked to the reduction in rm i's supply. Conditions (13) indicate that managerial incentive contracts should be designed so as to balance these two countervailing eects.
From Equations (9) and (10), we obtain (See Appendix A.1):
Replacing in Equation (13), P (Y ), P ′ (Y ), ∂Y /∂α i , ∂y i /∂α i and y i by their respective expressions, after straightforward calculations, we obtain:
Solving each of the above equations, we nd the expression of α i as a function of ∑ n i=1 α i :
Summing Equations (15) over i = 1, 2, . . . , n, results in
from which we extract the expression of the weighted sum of managerial incentives
Plugging this sum back into Equation (16) we nd:
Plugging α c i back into Equations (9), (10) and (11) yields:
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For the time being, let us assume that k is given and xed. Then, equilibrium values are presented in (20) . As expected the solution is symmetric. Furthermore, the solution is admissible (i.e., prices and quantities are strictly positive) provided that a > A. From Equation (19), we obtain:
Since admissibility implies a > A, it follows that ( a A − 1) > 0 and α c < 1. In other words, equilibrium managerial compensation contracts provide that managers will be rewarded for deviations from prot maximization that favor sales revenue generation. Now, observe
> 0, we nd that the equilibrium prot weight α c reaches a minimum when production generates no pollution (i.e., when ε = 1):
This is the same expression as found by Claude (2018) . Finally, still assuming that k is given, we cannot exclude that α c might be negative for some parameter values. Indeed, this could be the case for a > (n (n + 1) A) / (n − 1). However, in the next section it is shown that α c ranges in the interval [0, 1] when evaluated at the SPNE price k c .
Monopoly pricing
At stage 1, the upstream supplier sets the input price k so as to maximize its prot; i.e., the monopolist solves max k π c up = kn (y c /ε) .
Assuming an interior solution exists, the rst-order condition for prot maximization is
Solving the above equation for k, after straightforward computations, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the upstream monopolist precommits to a xed input price.
There exists a unique Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibrium. Equilibrium outcomes are, respectively,
Assumption 1 ensures that all the quantities given in the above proposition are non negative at the SPNE.
Remark 1. If ε = 1, we obtain the managerial incentive as in Claude (2018),
and the same equilibrium values. Moreover, as ε tends to τ / (a + τ ) the input price k c tends to zero, α c tends to one and both upstream and downstream prots tends to zero.
We obtain the following comparative statics results:
A reduction in pollution emissions or, equivalently in our model, an increase in the productivity of downstream rms, allows the upstream supplier to charge a higher input price k. Also, it provides rm owners with incentives to assign a lower weight to prot maximization in managerial compensation contracts. This lower weight encourages managers to adopt a more aggressive market behavior, which results in higher rm and industry output levels. As a result, both upstream and downstream prots rise. The exact inverse comparative static results obtains for changes in the tax rate τ . This should come as no surprise given the inverse relationship between productivity and pollution emissions in our model.
Finally, we have α c ∈ [0, 1], lim n→+∞ α c = 1, and ∂α c ∂n > 0, ∀n > 2. We conclude that α c is monotonically increasing in n and converges to one as the number of downstream rms become arbitrarily large. Indeed, as the number of rms increases, the downstream market becomes more competitive implying that aggregate output rises and market price falls. This in turn leads to a reduction in marginal revenue that must be compensated by lower production volumes. Firm owners achieve the required production cut by assigning a lower weight (1 − α) to sales in managerial compensation schemes.
Flexible pricing mechanism
We now turn to the second scenario in which the order of rms' moves is reversed. At the time when the upstream monopolist sets the input price, it is assumed that the terms of managerial compensation contracts are known and common knowledge. The timing of the game is depicted in Figure 1 . In stage 1, rm owners choose managerial incentives. In stage 2, the upstream monopolist sets the input price. We now are in a position to resume the backward induction procedure starting with the resolution of the monopolist pricing problem.
Input pricing
In stage 2, the upstream monopolist sets the input price k so as to maximize its prot:
The decision problem of the upstream monopolist then writes as
Assuming an interior solution exists, the optimal input price solves
Replacing y ⋆ i by its value from (10) and solving for the optimal input price k gives:
As we shall see below, Assumption 1 ensures that k f is positive for the SPNE value of α i .
Note that
An increase in the weight downstream rms place on prots results in a decrease in the output price. Alternatively, a greater sale orientation causes a reduction in the input price.
The economic intuition behind this result is straightforward. As the prot weight decreases, downstream managers are induced to behave more aggressively, producing more.
The increase in input demand then explains the increase in input price
Strategic delegation
In stage 1, each owner i simultaneously and independently sets the prot weight α i so as to maximize its prot. In other words, each owner i solves the following problem
First-order conditions for prot maximization are: 
where ω 0 =a 2 n 2 (n + 1)ε 2 , ω 2 = − nτ (1 − ε)(n(n + 1)(aε + ϕ) − 2aε),
with ϕ = (aε − τ (1 − ε) ).
The following proposition provides a characterization of equilibrium managerial incentives:
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium managerial incentives). Suppose that the upstream monopolist uses a exible pricing mechanism. Then, there exists a unique symmetric SPNE characterized as follows.
1. The equilibrium prot weight takes values on the interval (0, 1];
2. If production generates no pollution emission then it is given by α f ε=1 = n 2 (n−1)(n+2) ; 3. It is equal to oneimplying pure prot maximizationin two cases:
(a) if the downstream market consists in a duopoly and production generates no pollution emission (n = 2, ε = 1) and, (b) in the limit case where downstream rms are so inecient that they prefer to be inactive at the equilibrium (ε = τ /(a + τ )).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
We remark that Points 3(a) and (b) in Proposition 2 include as special cases results by Claude (2018) which correspond to the model without pollution (ε = 1). Assuming that α i = α f for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and plugging (28) into Equations (9)- (11) gives the following proposition: Proposition 3. Equilibrium prices, quantities and prot levels are, respectively, given by
Under Assumption 1, it is straightforward to show that the prices k f and P f and the quantities y f and Y f are strictly positive.
Comparing equilibrium outcomes
This section attempts to compare equilibrium outcomes depending on whether the upstream monopolist makes a price precommitment. A major diculty in doing this is due to the complexity of the expression for α f . To begin with, we analyze how the decision to precommit alters managerial incentives in the downstream market. We are able to state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Comparison of managerial incentives). 1. The equilibrium prot weight is lower when the upstream monopolist precommits to a xed input price; i.e., α c < α f .
2. As the number of downstream rms becomes arbitrarily large and irrespective of the pricing strategy adopted by the upstream monopolist, the equilibrium prot weight converges to 1, implying that the behavior of managerial rms is eventually identical to that of prot-maximizing owner-managed rms; i.e., lim n→∞ α h = 1, h = c, f.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The above proposition extends previous results by Claude (2018) , that were established under the assumption that there is no pollution (ε = 1). It states that downstream owners oer compensation schemes that favor sale orientation over prot maximization if the upstream monopolist makes a price precommitment.
The intuition for this result can be traced back to the dierence in the timing of moves between the two games that we consider. In the precommitment scenario, downstream owners set managerial incentives when the input price is known and has become common knowledge. Accordingly, in their decision-making process, they take the input price as xed and given. By contrast, in the other scenario, the upstream monopolist adjusts the input price to the observed degree of competition on the downstream market (as proxied by managerial incentives). Then, downstream owners recognize that the price they pay for the input x depends on the managerial incentives they give to their managers. Specically, they know that a greater sale orientation (a lower value for α f ) results in higher total downstream production, which, in turn, implies an increase in both input consumption and input price. The implied surge in production costs reduces the extent to which rm owners nd it protable to divert managers away from prot maximization; i.e. the value of (1 − α f ).
Finally, as the number of rms rises, the downstream market becomes increasingly competitive so that the strategic value of delegation vanishes. Then, the behavior of managerial rms converges to that of prot-maximizing owner-managed rms.
Next, we compare equilibrium input prices between the two scenarios. When the downstream market structure is a duopoly and no environmental externality exists, Liao (2008; 2010) showed that the upstream monopolist sets the same equilibrium price irrespective of whether a price commitment was made. However, Claude (2018) proved that precommitment results in a lower input price if more than two rms operate on the downstream market. The following proposition extends this result to more general contexts in which production is polluting the environment:
Proposition 5 (Comparison of input prices). If the downstream industry (i) is a duopoly which generates no pollution emission or (ii) consists of innitely many rms, then the upstream monopolist sets the same price in both scenarios (commitment or no commitment).
Otherwise, precommitment results in a lower equilibrium input price. (24) and (34), we obtain
Proof. From Equations
If n = 2 and ε = 1, then α f = 1 and k c = k f = a/2. Moreover, since α f tends to 1 as the number of downstream rms becomes arbitrarily large, it follows that lim n→∞ k c − k f = 0.
Turning to the comparison of production levels, we are able to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 6 (Comparison of downstream production levels). Downstream managers are encouraged to choose higher output levels if the upstream monopolist precommits to a xed input price; i.e., y c −y f > 0. Consequently, precommitment results in more pollution.
Proof. We have
It is easy to see that y c − y f > 0 if and only if α f >α wherẽ
From Proposition 4, recall that α f > α c . A little algebra shows that α c >α. Since α f >α, it follows that y c > y f .
The intuition for this result can be understood by considering propositions 4 and 5 above.
The former shows that, in the precommitment scenario, rm owners design compensation schemes so as to encourage a greater sale orientation (or, equivalently, a more aggressive market behavior). Under the same assumption, the latter proves that the upstream monopolist sets a lower input price. This, in turn, implies that the nal good y becomes less costly to produce. Then, the greater sale orientation combines with reduced production costs to encourage greater production and emissions of pollutant.
Next, we turn to the comparison of downstream and upstream prot levels. In the absence of environmental externalities, Claude (2018) showed the upstream monopolist is strictly better o when committing to a xed input price. The exact opposite holds for downstream rms: if the upstream supplier engages in xed price contracts, they earn lower prots.
These result might seem surprising at rst sight, since the upstream monopolist charges a lower input price in the precommitment scenario. However, the basic intuition for this result is simple. If the upstream monopolist adopts a exible pricing mechanism, downstream owners anticipate that a more aggressive market behavior will result in a higher input price. Then, each owner provides his management with lower sales incentives. In other words, each owner assigns a lower weight (1 − α) to sales in managerial compensation schemes. This alleviates the problem of over-competition among rms arising from strategic delegation.
However, by waiving the right to adjust the input price to changes in managerial incentives, the upstream monopolist place rm owners back into their initial prisoner's dilemma situation. This strategic move creates the conditions for an overproduction that is unprotable only for downstream owners. Indeed, precommitment makes the upstream monopolist better o since the surge in input consumption implied by overproduction more than compensates for the loss in revenue due to a reduced input price.
Unfortunately, if we relax the assumption that production causes no pollution, it becomes dicult to sign the dierence between prots in the two scenarios for arbitrary parameter values. With that said, we are still able to shed some light on how prots compare and oer interesting insights on this issue. Let us recall that the admissible values of ε lie in the range τ /(a + τ ) < ε < 1. By evaluating upstream and downstream prots at both extremities, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Comparison of prots). 1. If production causes no pollution, then the upstream monopolist is better o committing to a xed input price:
However, the precommittment decision of the upstream supplier is detrimental to downstream rms:
2. For a suciently high level of emission per unit of the nal good produced (or a suciently high environmental tax rate), downstream rms stop producing implying zero-prots for all:
Proof. By plugging the value of ε into the corresponding expressions.
We retrieve the same results as in Claude (2018) . As a work around for the diculty in signing dierences in upstream and downstream prots, we ran numerical simulations.
Despite extensive eorts, we found it impossible to nd even one numerical example that is admissible and reverses the ranking between prots in Proposition 7. If production generates few pollution emissions (ε is close to 1), numerical simulations conrm that the upstream rm is better-o when committing to a xed input price (i.e., π c up > π f up ).
The opposite (i.e., π c up < π f up ) was obtained only for so low values of ε that downstream rms produce nothing. Finally, we conrmed numerically that downstream rms makes lower prots in the precommitment scenario. We conclude that previous results by Claude (2018) are robust to the introduction of pollution emissions from productive activities.
Conclusion
Recent advances in the strategic delegation literature emphasize that factor market imperfections reduce the incentive business owners have to manipulate the structure of incentives embedded in managerial compensation contracts so as to encourage managers to deviate from prot maximization. The purpose of this paper was to re-examine this issue by allowing for pollution emissions and related environmental tax payments.
Two scenarios were considered depending on whether the upstream monopolist supplies the intermediate product through xed price contracts or relies on a exible pricing scheme. The corresponding two games were solved by backward induction. In both cases, we proved the existence of a unique Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibrium (SPNE).
Furthermore, we showed that the value of the equilibrium prot weight is restricted to the range from 0 to 1. It was shown that equilibrium managerial incentives encourage pure prot maximization only in limit cases. Hence, non-prot managerial incentives are expected to be the norm rather than the exception. Furthermore, except in limit cases, the following results hold. A price precommitment results in a lower input price which encourages greater production of the nal good and greater pollution emissions. Moreover, it makes the upstream supplier better o and downstream rms worse o. We conclude that upstream suppliers will choose to sign xed price contracts with their customers.
This paper has limitations. For tractability reason, we assumed identical rms. Relaxing this assumption oers interesting challenges for future research. Furthermore, our analysis has focused exclusively on how precommitment alters managerial incentives in downstream market. Accordingly, the rate of environmental taxation was regarded as exogenous and the welfare consequences of precommitment were not investigated. Future research could examine the normative question of optimal environmental policy.
A Appendices

A.1 Proof of Equation (14)
Recall that Firm i's equilibrium output level is
whereas that of Firm j (j 
Dierentiating Equations (38) and (39) yields :
and ∑ j̸ =i
Finally, we obtain :
A.2 Proof of Equation (31)
Let us consider the rst-order conditions for prot maximization which are given by :
From Equation (7), observe that
so that ∂yi
Plugging y i and ∂y i /∂α i back into (45), results in
we obtain :
and, nally,
Dierentiating Equation (9) ) .
Plugging the following quantities
yields the cubic equation (31).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us consider the existence problem rst. Let δ 0 = ω 2 2 − 3ω 3 ω 1 and δ 1 = 2ω 3 2 − 9ω 3 ω 2 ω 1 +27ω 2 3 ω 0 . The discriminant of the third-degree polynomial g(α) can be expressed as ∆ = −
. Let us show that ∆ < 0 so that Equation (31) has a unique real solution α f . To this end, it is convenient to express the discriminant as ∆ = η Γ where η = −4a 2 n(n + 1)τ 2 (ϵ − 1) 2 ϵ 2 < 0 and (57) Γ = β 0 + β 1 z + β 2 z 2 + β 3 z 3 + β 4 z 4 with z = (ε − 1) < 0 and (58) β 0 = a 4 ( n 2 + n − 2 ) 2 ( (n − 1)n(n + 2) 2 − 2 ) ϵ 4 ,
β 1 = −2a 3 (n(n(n(n(n(n(3n(n + 2) − 5) + 5) + 19) − 31) − 29) + 16) + 12)τ ϵ 3 ,
β 2 = a 2 (n + 1)(n(n(n(n(n(n(11n − 14) + 31) − 26) + 13) + 64) − 16) − 24)τ 2 ϵ 2 , (61) β 3 = −2a(n + 1) 2 ( 2n 2 − 1 ) ( n 2 (n(2n − 3) + 2) − 4 ) τ 3 ϵ,
β 4 = n 3 (n + 1) 3 ( 2n 2 − 1 ) τ 4 .
Examining Equations (59-63), we nd that β j is positive (resp., negative) if j is even (resp., odd), for all j = 0, . . . , 4. Since z < 0, it follows that Γ > 0 and thus ∆ < 0.
We proceed by showing that α f takes values on the interval (0, 1]. Since g(0) = ω 0 > 0, it follows that α f cannot be equal to zero. Moreover, when τ a+τ < ε ≤ 1 we nd that g(1) = 3 ∑ i=0 ω i = −(aε − τ (1 − ε)) (a (n − 2) (n + 1)ε + (n − 1)(1 − ε)nτ ) < 0.
It follows that g(α) has a sign change on the interval (0, 1). Finally, if ε = τ /(a + τ ) recall that (aε − τ (1 − ε)) = 0, so that g(1) = 0. Hence, the unique real root α f takes values on (0, 1].
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
1. We proved that g(α) has a sign change on the interval (0, 1). Observe that g(α) > 0 implies that α < α f . It follows that α c < α f if g(α c ) > 0. Then, the proof reduces to showing that g (α c ) > 0.
Straightforward computations yield g(α c ) = Φ h(t) where Φ = 2aε(aε−τ (1−ε)) (n 2 +1) 2 (aε+τ (1−ε)) 3 > 0 and h(t) = h 0 + h 1 τ + h 2 τ 2 + h 3 τ 3 , with h 0 =a 3 ε 3 (n + 1) ( n 2 + 1 ) ( n 2 − 2n + 2 ) > 0, h 1 = a 2 (2n + 1)((n − 1)n + 2) 2 (1 − ε)ε 2 > 0,
h 2 =a ( n ( n ( n 3 + 2n + 4 ) + 3 ) + 2 ) (1 − ε) 2 ε > 0, h 3 = n(n + 1) 2 (1 − ε) 3 > 0.
Let ∆(h) denote the discriminant of h(τ ). By direct computation, we nd that ∆(h) = −a 6 (n − 1) 6 n(n + 1) 2 (ε − 1) 6 ε 6 Γ, where (67) Γ = ( 8n 10 − n 9 + 6n 8 + 59n 7 − 48n 6 + 156n 5 + 64n 4 + 28n 3 + 96n 2 − 68n − 64 ) .
Since Γ is strictly positive, it follows that ∆(h) < 0. Hence, the cubic equation h (τ ) has a unique real solution. Since h(τ )| τ =0 = a 3 (n + 1) ( n 2 + 1 ) ( n 2 − 2n + 2 ) ε 3 > 0, and h ′ (t) > 0, it follows that h(τ ) > 0 for all τ ∈ [0, aε 1−ε ]. Then Φ>0 implies that g (α c ) > 0 so that α c < α f .
2. Since lim n→∞ α c (n) = 1 and α c (n) < α f (n) ≤ 1, it follows that lim n→∞ α f (n) = 1.
